Introduction
This book explores the topics of interculturalism and multiculturalism, including their relationships to each other and to public philosophies more broadly. In many respects it is a timely and perhaps overdue intervention that locates the debate about interculturalism and multiculturalism in amongst a series of sociological and political developments. It is widely accepted that the significant movement and settlement of people outside their country of birth 'is now structurally embedded in the economies and societies of most countries ' (Pécoud and de Guchteneire argue, 2007: 5) . The prevailing context is that the majority of the world's population resides in one hundred and seventy five poorer countries relative to the wealth that is disproportionately concentrated in around twenty. With levels of migration fluctuating but anxieties constant, it is common to hear governments and other agencies favour 'managed migration' and strategies for 'integration' which, though meaning different things in different places, registers migration and post-migration settlement as an intractable feature of contemporary society.
As we show below, this has immediate implications for the approaches that interculturalists and multiculturalists adopt, but this sociological development is matched by a political tendency, in so far as any story of the 'plural century' cannot be restricted to migration only, and must also take account of what we might think of as state re-making. One illustration is found in modes of sub-state national and federal governance that resist the drive for a unitary and centralised state citizenship, and so challenge how one 'dominant group organises the common life in a way that reflects its own authority and culture' (Walzer, 1997: 25; cf., Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero, 2014) . Large territorially concentrated communities who see themselves as autonomous nations within nation-states are the most obvious example of this. Despite what is sometimes claimed therefore, these remind us that all of today's nation-states reflect some longstanding internal diversity (not withstanding what status non-majority cultural forms may have enjoyed). A second form of state-remaking has less to do with territory and autonomy and more to do with overarching collective membership. This is about legal rights but also about symbols and political equality and remaking citizenship to include 'difference'. What it shares with first the expression of state remaking flows from an underlying concern that minorities will 'feel crucially left out [when] the majority understand the polity as an expression of their nation, or agreed purpose, whatever it may be' (Taylor, 2001: 123) . In this respect it is striking that there seems to be greater minority integration in countries with more multiculturalist policies than in those with none. So controlling for other factors, when the same ethnic minority group (with the same pre-arrival characteristics) enters two different countries at the same time, it has been shown that the group who are in the multicultural context fares much better (Bloemraard, 2006) . 1 1 In her study, Bloemraard (2006) compared the integration of two Vietnamese groups in Toronto and Canada respectively, and then repeated this for Portuguese minorities. According to Kymlicka (2012: 46) , in these cases Canada's proactive multicultural policies 'sent a clear message that Vietnamese [and Portuguese] political participation is welcome, and have also provided material and logistical support for self-organization and political representation of the community'. Elsewhere, Berry et al. (2006) use the International Comparative Study of Ethnocultural Youth (which focuses on thirteen countries and takes in 5000 young people) to argue that polices and discourses of multiculturalism (e.g. plural national identities, equal opportunity monitoring, effective anti-discrimination legislation and enforcement) encourage a more successful and deeply established integration in those settings. In the British case, this is supported by Heath and Roberts (2008: 2) , who in their analyses of the UK Government's Citizenship survey, report: 'We find no evidence that Muslims or people of Pakistani heritage were in general less attached to Britain than were other religions or ethnic groups. Ethnic minorities show clear evidence of 'dual' rather than
Taken together, what we describe further complicates long established tensions 'between the universalistic principles ushered in by the American and French Revolutions and the particularities of nationality, ethnicity, gender, 'race', and language ' (Benhabib, 2002: vii) .
The point being that all liberal democratic citizenship has been cut from a cloth coloured by prevailing national cultures and identities, and new modes of citizenship have developed that seek to correct this. In their own ways both interculturalists and multiculturalists offer such a move, and both register 'a third generation norm of legitimacy, namely respect for reasonable cultural diversity, which needs to be considered on a par with the [first and
second generation] norms of freedom and equality, and so to modify policies of 'free and equal treatment' accordingly' (Tully, 2002: 102) . While different political contexts express distinct stories, something that is emphatically brought out in the proceeding focus between post-migration multicultural settlements and the status of nationalist settlements respectively, both interculturalism and multiculturalism seeks to be a vehicle for what Tully (2001: 25) calls 'citizenization' -the processes of incorporation into and (as a consequence) revision of prevailing citizenship settlements.
It is against this background that our concepts of interculturalism and multiculturalism have developed their normative and political content. While this content unfolds throughout the rest of the introduction and indeed the book more broadly, it would be useful at this juncture to provide a pocket overview of how we understand the provenance of each. For the purposes of our discussion, interculturalism's core meaning refers to support for crosscultural dialogue. Bouchard and Taylor (2012: 118) the political accommodation by the state and/or a dominant group of all minority cultures defined first and foremost by reference to race or ethnicity, and, additionally but more controversially, by reference to other group-defining characteristics such as nationality, aboriginality, or religion. The latter is more controversial not only because it extends the range of the groups that have to be accommodated, but also because it tends to make larger political claims and so tends to resist having these claims reduced to those of immigrants. (Modood and Meer 2013: 113) In ways that have both overlapped and diverged therefore, both interculturalism and multiculturalism is seeking to engender certain kinds of unity in polities that have seen what
Arnold Toynbee (1958: 87) termed 'the annihilation of distance'. This problematic emerges across a multifaceted set of arguments presented throughout the chapters in this book, and takes up intellectual and policy debates that span Europe, and South and North America.
Debating the Dividing Lines
This book is presented in the context of a widespread (but contested) view that there has been a retreat from relatively modest approaches of multicultural citizenship across a variety of citizenship regimes (Meer, Mouritsen, Faas and de Witte, 2015) . The reasons are various, but include how for some, multiculturalism has facilitated social fragmentation and entrenched social divisions, for others it has distracted attention away from socio-economic disparities or encouraged a moral hesitancy amongst 'native' populations. Some even blame it for international terrorism (Phillips, 2006; Prins and Salisbury, 2008 (Guidikova, 2014: 1) . As is stated in its founding documents, placing emphasis on the fact that IC is basically seen as a local and especially city-level means of responding to diversity (Zapata-Barrero, 2015) . In this framing, '[o] ne of the defining factors that will determine, over coming years, which cities flourish and which decline will be the extent to which they allow their diversity to be their asset… Whilst 4 http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/culture/Cities/Publication/BookCoE06-Guidikova.pdf national and supra-national bodies will continue to wield an influence it will increasingly be the choices that cities themselves make which will seal their future' (Council of Europe 2008, 22) . The British Council (quoted in Phipps, 2014: 109) too has insisted in the need for interculturalism, specifically in order to 'develop a deeper understanding of diverse perspectives and practices; to increase participation and the freedom and ability to make choices; to foster equality; and to enhance creative processes'.
Despite the fact that the evidence is that there has not been a wholesale or even a significant retreat from multiculturalism, 5 statements such as these above have invited the question:
how are interculturalism and multiculturalism similar or different, substantively or otherwise, from each other? In this collection we bring together two otherwise parallel -but largely unrelated -attempts to answer this question. The first centres not in Europe but in North America, and especially surrounds the Consultation Commission on the
Accommodation of Practices Related to Cultural Differences, commissioned by the Québec
Government, widely known as the Bouchard and Taylor report(2008) . This maintains that
Quebec as a nation has developed a distinctive intercultural approach to diversity that is quite distinct to Federal Canadian multiculturalism. As one of the authors of the report puts it, 'The crucial point here is that there really is a majority culture within the nation of Quebec whose fragility is a permanent fact of life. This results in a specific vision of nationhood, identity and national belonging.' (Bouchard, 2011: 463 See also Bouchard this volume) Thus 5 For example, if we take two countries seen as multiculturalist (the UK and the Netherlands) and two countries that are not seen as multiculturalist (Denmark and Germany). Using Banting and Kymlicka's (2013, pp. 7-8) Multiculturalism Policy Index, which monitors multicultural public policies across 21 Western democracies across three intervals (1980, 2000, and 2010) , we see that that in 2000, the Netherlands and Britain scored 5.5 and 5.5 out of a possible 8, respectively, and Denmark and Germany scored 0.5 and 2, respectively. By 2010, the score for the Netherlands had been reduced to 2, Britain remained the same, Denmark was at 0, and Germany had increased to 2.5. This offers a mixed picture of the fate of multiculturalism that is given qualitative support in Vertovec and Wessendorf's (2010) reading that while the term multiculturalism has 'disappeared from the political rhetoric' (p. 18), this is something that is not paralleled by the 'eradication, nor much to the detriment, of actual measures, institutions, and frameworks of minority cultural recognition' (p. 21). interculturalism as an integration policy (Guidikova, 2015) , and a way to manage city-level public spaces (Wood, 2015) . It was nurtured in management and urban studies on diversity, focusing on policy and implementation (Zapata-Barrero, 2015b), and assumed that diversity is itself a culture that should be promoted through an intercultural strategy (Zapata-Barrero, 2015a).
In both cases, although expressed differently, advocates of interculturalism wish to emphasize its positive qualities in terms of addressing a gap that multiculturalism allegedly food, dress and so on. In this respect there was ambition to remake the common institution and curriculum to include minorities too. This became married to a parallel equality focus that had a civil rights provenance, and which together developed more broadly into the contemporary meaning of multiculturalism as a critique of 'the myth of homogeneous and monocultural nation-states' (Castles 2000: 5) , and an advocacy of the right of minority 'cultural maintenance and community formation, linking these to social equality and protection from discrimination' (ibid.). The political multiculturalism of Modood (2006: 61) , for example, insists that 'when new groups enter a society, there has to be some education and refinement of…sensitivities in the light of changing circumstances and the specific vulnerabilities of new entrants ' (2006: 61) .
Multiculturalists however argue that much of this is consistent with interculturalist objectives. Kymlicka (this volume) presents an especially challenging response: 'The interculturalism-as-remedy-for-failed-multiculturalism trope is not offered as an objective social science account of our situation, but rather, I believe, is intended to serve as a new narrative, or if you like, a new myth.' A series of debates have therefore emerged but too often these have remained spatially restricted to either Europe or North America, and so are rarely bridged and connected to each other, or are restricted to broad categories which locate interculturalism and multiculturalism in, for example, a 'duality' and 'diversity' paradigm respectively (Bouchard, this volume -Firstly, both interculturalism and multiculturalism register not only the undeniable fact of cultural pluralism but see this as an asset even while each is committed to reconciling this diversity with unity -Secondly, each has a shared adversary in assimilationist and unreconstructed ideas of membership and policy perspectives concerning citizenship -Thirdly, there is a common aversion to formalist (or deontological) notions of liberalism that do not take into consideration the role and function of culture and identity -Fourthly, each seeks to remake the terms of fair and equal treatment through the inclusion of cultural difference.
Where there appears to be more tension is explicitly taken up in the various chapters that follow and can perhaps also be identified in terms of four themes:
-Firstly, the status of dialogue, contact and interpersonal relations within respective approaches -Secondly, the position of historical majority cultural forms -or majority precedence -Thirdly, the normative significance of recognising groups in addition to individual citizens -Fourthly, the status of minority religious communities and organisations.
On the second issue, Bouchard (2011: 438) usefully summarises how: 'interculturalism concerns itself with the interests of the majority culture, whose desire to perpetuate and maintain itself as perfectly legitimate, as much as it does with the interests of minorities and immigrants'. In this respect interculturalism addresses multiculturalism's alleged asymmetry in focusing only on the 'minority'. What is interesting is that this broadly stays within conventional parameters e.g., it is not only liberal nationalists who think that historical 'elective affinities' (Canovan, 1996) (Meer and Modood, forthcoming) . Turning in detail to the first issue of contention, the status of dialogue and contact for interculturalists, the argument is best put by Zapata-Barrero (this volume), to whom the core of intercultural citizenship is essentially one basic idea: that the interaction among people from different diversity attributions matters, and that this has been overlooked by the multicultural citizenship paradigm, which has mainly concentrated on ensuring the cultural rights of diverse groups.
To explore both issues further the next section of this introduction locates both intercultural and multicultural concerns within the wider intellectual landscape. The important point to bear in mind at the outset, however, and as the subsequent chapters betray, is that neither interculturalists nor multiculturalists occupy a position of unanimity amongst themselves, and interculturalists and multiculturalists can and do agree. A good place to begin to understand why concerns the common denominator of the role and nature of pluralism;
something that has both shared and diverging implications for interculturalism and multiculturalism, and it is to this we next turn.
Inter-and multi-cultural pluralism
The fact of pluralism, to paraphrase Rawls, emerges as self-evident in a world comprising over six hundred languages, five hundred ethno-cultural groups, and innumerable religions spread across nearly two hundred recognized sovereign states. By definition therefore pluralism is an inescapable feature of human societies, and 'can neither be wished out of existence nor suppressed without an unacceptable degree of coercion, and often not even then' (Parekh, 2000: 196) . Different kinds of polities have long struggled with reconciling cultural pluralism with an idea of collective membership. In one respect this is odd because the intermingling of cultural (including religious and ethnic) diversity is as old as we can record. On the other hand it may well be anticipated that un-settling established social and identity configurations creates challenges, something that is no less apparent in modern polities. The way pluralism is conceived obviously has implications for understanding the relationships between interculturalism and multiculturalism and other ways of reconciling unity and diversity. Minimally, we might build on the distinction Isaiah Berlin (1991: 10) put forward between pluralism and relativism. While the latter flattens out our capacity to make value judgments, according to Berlin, the former retains this capacity but anchors it in an ability to imagine and empathize with that which is different to us. He elaborates:
Members of one culture can, by the force of imaginative insight, understand… the value, the ideals, the forms of life of another culture or society, even those remote in time or space. They may find these values unacceptable, but if they open their minds sufficiently they can grasp how one might be a full human being, with whom one could communicate, at the same time live in the light of values widely different from one's own, but which nevertheless one can see to be values, ends of life, by the realization of which men could be fulfilled.
This value pluralism can endow agents with a capacity to see the world from different vantage points, which is quite different to how pluralism is sometimes understood as, say, a set of governmental approaches. The latter are not purely theoretical, though they take in theory, but instead centre on an understanding of democracy as a competition between rival elites (Dahl 1961) , or a conception of organized groups which form a link between the governed and representative government (Bentley 1948) . In Berlin's statement, in contrast, pluralism bestows a certain insight into real and imagined cultural differences, ways of life and forms of social organization.
Contact and Dialogue
This insight is not neutral, that is to say that it is not without judgment on our part, but is nonetheless able to register a utility in different approaches. Our interest here primarily concerns how both interculturalism and multiculturalism appeal to a common register of pluralism on which contact and dialogue contact can proceed. In one respect this is an obvious ambition. As Carbaugh (2013: 10) asks: 'Who, indeed, would be against "dialogue"?'
The challenge is surely to make an abstract ambition not only operable but also politically meaningful. Dialogue, to paraphrase Augustine on charity, is no substitute for justice. And the complaint arises that in recent years we have seen a significant intellectual investment in dialogue in a manner that is sometimes uncoupled from wider political contexts (see Phipps, 2014 Since human capacities and values conflict, every culture realizes a limited range of them and neglects, marginalizes and suppresses others. However rich it may be, no culture embodies all that is valuable in human life and develops the full range of human possibilities. Different cultures thus correct and complement each other, expand each other's horizon of thought and alert each other to new forms of human fulfillment. The value of other cultures is independent of whether or not they are options for us...inassimilable otherness challenges us intellectually and morally, stretches our imagination, and compels us to recognize the limits of our categories of thought.
Going further than Berlin's 'imaginative insight', Parekh uses the idea of intercultural dialogue as a basis to widen the horizons of our thought or of a way of life. Moreover, Parekh thinks dialogue rather than an appeal to universal truths is the way to handle multicultural conflicts like those over free speech and protecting minorities from demeaning speech, or the virtues of exclusively legalised monogamy over the inclusion of polygamy. This can be contrasted to rationalist conceptions of dialogue. In the latter camp Habermas (1987) 
Groups and Nations
At this juncture some interculturalists and multiculturalists diverge on the status of historical majorities for, as Modood (2014: 306 and this volume) Since the middle of the nineteenth century, francophones in Quebec have fought to gain acceptance of the idea that Canada is composed of two nations (Anglophone and Francophone). This vision of the country was undermined by the introduction of multiculturalism, which made francophones in Quebec simply one ethnic group among others throughout Canada. In this sense, multiculturalism weakened Quebec and for this reason it is the source of keen opposition from the francophone population). (Bouchard, 2011: 462) .
This framing and the wider distinction between Quebec interculturalism and Canadian multiculturalism is certainly a contested one (see Kymlicka this volume), and might be illustrative of the difference between what Levey (this volume) sees as 'hard' and 'soft' distinctions. Quebec interculturalists insist that there should be a public space and identity that is not merely about individual constitutional or legal rights, and this public space is an identity for those who share it and so qualifies and counter-balances other identities valued by citizens. So far so Republican. The important point is that this is deemed to have an inescapable historical character, such that Quebec, and not merely federal Canada, is an object to which immigrants need to have identification with and integrate into, and should seek to maintain Quebec as a nation and not just a federal province. 7 While for some Quebec is a nation within federal Canada, this interculturalism argument is not predicated on minority nationalism or multi-nationalism, but on a paradigm of minority-majority relations that are applicable to any nation and certainly would be asserted in an independent mono-national Quebec. As such, and quite unlike their European counterparts (see Cantle, and Zapata-Barrero this volume), Quebec interculturalists are not minded to begin with the diversity of the location that migrants and ethnic minorities are from, or the superdiversity that this is alleged to cultivate therein. Guidikova (2014: 14) , for example, insists that interculturalism in its European moulds 'thrives on a dynamic and constantly changing environment in which individuals and collectives express multiple, hybrid and evolving identities and needs'. This is very different to sustaining and elevating historically sedimented ad hoc majority precedence.
The difference between the two types of interculturalism bears resemblance instead to how Levey (this volume) draws out the differences between 'parity multiculturalists' and 'liberal nationalist multiculturalism' which, as he understands it, turns on the treatment of majority cultures. On this view since a Rawlsian neutral state organised by liberal principles alone is impossible, the best means of achieving liberal goals, including personal liberties, autonomy, freedom for cultural diversity, liberal constitutionalism and the welfare state, is through the stable basis of a nation or a nation-state or a multi-nation (Miller, 1995) .
As Loobuyk (this volume) puts it: 'distributive justice and deliberative democracy require that citizens share more than simply political principles, but less than a shared conception of the good life. A shared but 'thin' national identity should and can be sufficient'. The difference between this 'liberal national multiculturalism' and what Levey terms 'parity multiculturalism', however, is not seismic, and presents a smaller cleavage than that between Quebec and European conceptions of interculturalism.
This should not imply however that there are not significant differences between the liberal nationalist, interculturalist and multiculturalist camps. Like a Venn diagram they can simultaneously occupy common and distinct areas. If we take up Levey's (this volume) challenge of contrasting liberal nationalists with political multiculturalists, beyond the issue of majority precedence that he uses to distinguish the two, a number of observations can be made. It is clear that political multiculturalism can be more receptive to the place of religion in public life, or more precisely that religion is not precluded a priori on the grounds that it makes claims of a different order to those relating to ethnicity or culture. Furthermore, and in a manner that returns us to the discussion of the majority, the terms of common membership, especially -though not exclusively -in relation to national identity are deemed more fluid and changeable. Thirdly, and perhaps at a more foundational level, political multiculturalists such as Modood (2013) and critiquing illiberal cultural practices, each of these qualities too are important (on occasion foundational) features of multiculturalism. Importantly, they explore the provenance of multiculturalism as an intellectual tradition, with a view to assessing the extent to which its origins continue to shape its contemporary public 'identity' to show how some of the criticism of multiculturalism is rooted in an objection to earlier formulations that displayed precisely those elements deemed unsatisfactory when compared with interculturalism. They maintain, however, that interculturalism -as a political discoursedoes not, intellectually at least, eclipse multiculturalism, and so should be considered as complementary to multiculturalism.
To some extent Zapata-Barreo reframes this challenge in arguing that the multicultural debates of the late twentieth century tended to follow a cultural rights-based approach to diversity. He maintains that these were centred on questions such as the rights of cultural recognition in the public sphere, and how to reassess equality and cultural rights of nonnational citizens with different languages, religions, and cultural practices. This approach characterized multicultural citizenship studies until the emergence of a 'new paradigm of interculturalism' which, in his reading, offers a lifeline to all those who see diversity as an asset in the public square. In providing a theoretically driven account of the 'intercultural turn', Zapata-Barrero proposes an over-arching political theory that can function as a normative framework.
In the first of our chapters tackling the interculturalism-multiculturalism nexus from a Quebec perspective, Gerard Bouchard returns us to the view that pluralism provides the general background of interculturalism, and which translates into respect for human rights, support for immigration, assistance to minority languages and cultures, wider practices of accommodation, and so forth. He moves on from this to insist that at the micro-level, a second defining trait of interculturalism is its emphasis on exchange and interaction between citizens of all origins, with a view to activating diversity as a resource, fighting stereotypes, avoiding 'groupism' and preventing social exclusion. His model of interculturalism, moreover, stresses integration as a two-way process but, in addition, is designed for societies where perceptions of ethno-cultural realities are structured on the basis of a majorityminorities relationship. In this view the protection of minority rights must be reconciled with majority rights, which also calls for some forms of ad hoc, contextual precedence in favour of the majority culture.
In the second of our readings of interculturalism from a Quebec context, Gagnon and
Iacovino frame the merits of interculturalism as an explicit model for integration. They contrast this with how they see Canadian multiculturalism as being a product of nationbuilding efforts, rather than a genuine commitment to the main tenets of multiculturalism, they maintain, it is a framework for the promotion of cultural pluralism. They contend that a model of cultural pluralism along the lines of Quebec interculturalism makes a more serious effort to balance the requirements of unity with the preservation, recognition, and the flourishing of minority cultures. At the same time they note the enduring problem confronting the Quebec model, one that would have to be taken into account in any future attempts at empirical verification. Namely, the idea of competing interpretations of citizenship by those identified for integration in the first place. The Quebec model is, they maintain, placed to address this because it is embedded in a larger project for national affirmation. The fact that it can legitimately be included as a model for integration at the very least demonstrates the strides that Quebec has made in the area of citizenship.
A contrasting reading of interculturalism comes from Ted Cantle's contribution, and which begins with the view that multicultural policies, in Europe at least, are not fit for purpose and have slowed, if not inhibited, both integration and the acceptance of difference.
Interculturalism for Cantle is based upon an entirely different conceptual and policy framework and offers a new and progressive approach to how we learn to live with diversity.
In this view the Bouchard and also Gagon and Iacovino readings of interculturalism have been the most difficult to sustain because they mirror what he argues is a reified, static and defensive form of identity management in European forms of multiculturalism.
Interestingly, Cantle sees the Canadian Government form of multiculturalism as being closer to the European idea of interculturalism. Cantle (2012: 79) nonetheless maintains that 'Interculturalism should…build upon the essential elements of multiculturalism -the framework of rights to equal treatment and non-discrimination are critical -as well as developing the interaction and belonging programmes initiated by community cohesion.' In this regard, while multiculturalism's focus on inequalities was justified, he argues it has failed to adapt to 'super-diversity' and the multi-faceted aspects of difference and 'otherness', including those based on disability, age, sexual orientation and gender -what we might otherwise call intersectionality. Further, for Cantle multiculturalism remained firmly rooted in intra-national differences, between minority and majority populations, and can be contrasted with interculturalism which recognises that 'difference' now crosses national boundaries and also reflects the heterogeneity of national, ethnic and faith groups.
These robust challenges are met with an equally vigorous rejoinder from Will Kymlicka. In Stepping outside the North American-Western European nexus, Ana Solana's chapter brings in Latin American academic debates about multiculturalism, interculturalism, and interculturalidad, identifying patterns, similarities, and differences among them. Her chapter provides an introduction to a form of interculturalism, Latin American interculturalidad, which emerged not as a response to post-immigrant social formations but to colonial and post-colonial dynamics and relationships, including but not limited to indigenous groups. She argues that across the continent, academic discussions largely 'prescribe and dichotomize models of diversity' (this volume). In contrast, she advocates a contextual approach that opens up potential avenues for dialogue and cross-pollination.
Focusing especially on how Latin American scholars define interculturalidad, and especially its capacity for 'equitable relations among members of different cultural universes' (Godennzi Alegre 1996: 15, in Solana this volume). There is however no one simple or agreed-upon definition of interculturalidad among scholars, particularly because interculturalidad in the Latin American context is conceived as a work in progress. The important acknowledgement is that interculturalism also exists in contexts other than North America (especially Canada) and Europe, and that emerges in contexts where multiculturalism has not been the predominant diversity paradigm. In these cases it is not necessarily a reaction to dissatisfaction presumably caused by multiculturalism, which means that interculturalidad in Latin America is not as recent as some scholars might assume.
Our final three papers return us to the theme of possible reconciliations between interculturalism and multiculturalism. In the first by Geoff Levey, we observe that the tensions between interculturalism and multiculturalism can also run across interculturalism and multiculturalism. So while the issue of 'ad hoc majority precedence' is central between multiculturalism and interculturalism, at least on the Québec model, in Levey's reading it also runs across liberal nationalist multiculturalism and parity multiculturalism too. The second, by Patrick Loobuyck, understands interculturalism neither as an antimulticulturalist position nor as a remedy for the alleged failures of multiculturalism, but instead as an additional strategy that might rest alongside modes of liberal nationalism and constitutional patriotism. The challenge that each sets itself, in this reading, is to create a sense of belonging as a necessary condition for solidarity and deliberative democracy in multicultural societies. Loobuyck understands this as presently expressed across three intercultural policy applications concerned with social mixing, language and civic integration programs, and integrative religious education respectively. In this account while multiculturalism and interculturalism do not contradict each other on the theoretical level, there may be some tensions on the policy level.
In the final chapter Modood, a European multiculturalist directly engages with Quebecan interculturalism. He acknowledges that Quebecan interculturalists have raised the question of the normative significance of the majority in the way that multiculturalists have not; and that multiculturalists can learn from those interculturalists. However, he holds that multiculturalists can take on board this concern with the majority without changing or amending multiculturalism. He accepts the starting-points of the 'ad hoc majority precedence' argument but not the conclusions. To underline the point he concludes by reaffirming a commitment to accommodate ethnoreligious minorities that is very different from what is advocated by Quebeckers. So, despite emphasising the overlaps and dialogical connexions between Quebecan interculturalism and multiculturalism as he understands it, he is of the view that they clearly differ on fundamentals too.
This indeed could also be said to be the message of the book: there are different versions of multiculturalism and interculturalism; within each set there are differences even while there is significant common ground across the two sets. This is a sentiment shared by Bhikhu Parekh, as stated in his afterword, whose own position is one which marries interculturalism and multiculturalism. He is nonetheless willing to acknowledge that there are some other things that we can learn from more recent interculturalist critics, while rejecting the view that multiculturalism is flawed and needs to be replaced or that intercultrualism is a successor position. In this respect there are not fundamental differences between the two 'isms'. So, that while interculturalisms add to multiculturalisms they do not always understand the latter, and certainly cannot be said to supersede political multiculturalism as it has been built up in theory and practice over the decades on both sides of the North Atlantic.
